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CONSTRAINING MONITORS
Veronica Root*
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, Herbalife, a global nutrition company, which once boasted net
sales of $4.8 billion, entered into a negotiated settlement with the Federal
Trade Commission to resolve allegations that it engaged in deceptive
business and marketing practices.1 The Federal Trade Commission alleged
“that the multi-level marketing company’s compensation structure was unfair
because it rewards distributors for recruiting others to join and purchase
products in order to advance in the marketing program, rather than in
response to actual retail demand for the product, causing substantial
economic injury to many of its distributors.”2 The nature of the allegations
brought against Herbalife sparked debates about whether Herbalife, a large,
publicly traded company, was actually a pyramid scheme and resulted in
Herbalife agreeing to pay $200 million to compensate consumers and settle
charges brought by the Federal Trade Commission.3
Additionally, Herbalife agreed to “pay for an Independent Compliance
Auditor (ICA) who will monitor the company’s adherence to [the court
ordered settlement provisions] requiring restructuring of [Herbalife’s]
compensation plan” for a period of seven years.4 A monitor is “(i) an
independent, private outsider, (ii) employed after an institution is found to
have engaged in wrongdoing, (iii) who effectuates remediation of the

* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Many thanks to Margaret F. Brinig,
Guy-Uriel Charles, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Daniel B. Kelly, Jeffrey Pojanowski, and Jay
Tidmarsh and to the participants of the Fordham University School of Law Stein Center’s
colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials for helpful comments
and conversations. Special thanks to Christine Fimogniari and Catherine Malone for
invaluable research assistance. For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik,
Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899
(2017).
1. See Press Release, FTC, Herbalife Will Restructure Its Multi-Level Marketing
Operations and Pay $200 Million for Consumer Redress to Settle FTC Charges (July 15, 2016)
[hereinafter Herbalife Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/
07/herbalife-will-restructure-its-multi-level-marketing-operations [https://perma.cc/Q6PP5WAN]; see also Frank Partnoy, Is Herbalife a Pyramid Scheme?, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/wall-streets-6-billion-mystery/
361624/ [http://perma.cc/7JQF-Y2U4].
2. Herbalife Press Release, supra note 1.
3. See Partnoy, supra note 1; Herbalife Press Release, supra note 1.
4. Herbalife Press Release, supra note 1.
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institution’s misconduct, and (iv) provides information to outside actors
about the status of the institution’s remediation efforts.”5
Monitorships are highly sought-after engagements, and the Herbalife
monitorship is no exception. The Federal Trade Commission issued a public
“Request for Applications to Serve As Independent Compliance Auditor for
Herbalife” and received at least twenty-six applications.6 The majority of the
applicants were lawyers and law firms, but applications were also sent from
financial companies and consulting agencies.7 In large part, monitorships are
prized engagements because they are, traditionally, very profitable. One firm
estimated that its monitoring costs of Herbalife would be approximately
$15.7 million over the life of the seven-year term, while another indicated a
range from $7.8 to $11.5 million.8
As the Herbalife monitorship demonstrates, there are strong financial
incentives for parties to pursue monitorships. For example, the individual
appointed as “the monitor” can often charge in excess of $1,000 an hour for
her work alone.9 Individuals who serve as monitors also have strong
incentives to be repeat players in the monitorship game. In part, this is
because monitorships are engagements entered into for finite periods and are
associated with cooling-off periods before the monitored organization can
employ the monitor in another capacity.10 Thus, to guarantee long-term
sources of revenue, individuals and organizations attempting to serve as
monitors must pursue other representations.
Monitors have these strong financial motivations while also having been
granted an enormous amount of responsibility to ensure remediation efforts
are properly undertaken at the embattled firm. In some instances, this
oversight is engaged in to ensure that organizations adhere to U.S. policy
concerns, like the United States’s position that bribery is an illegitimate
method of obtaining certain business opportunities.11 But in others, monitors
are utilized to ensure that everyday citizens are awarded proper compensation
for large-scale corporate misconduct, such as when banks improperly entered
into foreclosure proceedings against thousands of homeowners.12

5. Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 111 (2016).
6. C. Ryan Barber, So You Want to Be the Herbalife Compliance Monitor?: Join the
Crowd, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202766554985/
So-You-Want-to-be-the-Herbalife-Compliance-Monitor-Join-the-Crowd [https://perma.cc/
4HL5-3MJW].
7. Id.
8. C. Ryan Barber, Big Law Firms Reveal Rates in Pitches for Herbalife Monitor,
LAW.COM (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/09/06/big-law-firmsreveal-rates-in-pitches-for-herbalife-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/USK9-2NYR].
9. Id.
10. See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching
Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321, 347–48,
354–55 (2011).
11. See Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 533–
34 (2014) (discussing a monitorship arising out of an alleged scheme to make unlawful
payments to foreign officials to secure contracts).
12. See Root, supra note 5, at 124–25 (discussing monitorship that arose out of the
“National Mortgage Settlement”).
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As a result, the stakes are quite high, and it is important that monitors
effectuate their duties properly and completely. One might think there are
official guidelines governing monitors and monitorships when one considers
that what are essentially private citizens are given an immense amount of
responsibility for effectuating remediation efforts that are of significance to
the public. There are not. The power of the court to intervene in monitorships
is very much in flux. Statutory schemes aimed at governing monitorships
have stalled and guidance issued by the American Bar Association is
nonbinding and of little use for nonlawyer monitors. The primary factor that
appears to govern behavior across all monitorships is the monitor’s own
interest in maintaining her good reputation. This reliance on reputation
persists despite (i) conflicts regarding the disclosure of monitor reports,13 (ii)
concerns regarding cronyism in the monitor appointment process,14 and (iii)
worries about the limited systems for sanctioning monitor misconduct.15
Part I of this Article explains the failure of recent attempts by courts and
legislators to constrain monitor behavior. Part II then argues that one reason
for the lack of monitorship regulation lies in the reluctance of bar associations
to oversee quasi-legal behavior. It then explains why reputation appears to
be the primary factor reigning in monitor behavior today. Part III discusses
implications of this Article’s findings. Specifically, it discusses concerns
regarding the disclosure of information, the boundaries of the relationship
between a monitor and other parties, and the ways a monitor’s identity might
be utilized as a sanctioning mechanism. Monitors and those who utilize them
confront these challenges every day without formal regulatory guidance.
I. DIFFICULTY WITH CONSTRAINING MONITORS
The competition to serve as Herbalife’s monitor was quite fierce. The
winner of this competition was Affiliated Monitors, Inc.16 Affiliated
Monitors is neither an accounting nor law firm. Rather, it is an organization
that provides “independent integrity monitoring, compliance/best practice
programs, auditing, assessments, and other services across a wide range of
regulated industries.”17 In its application, Affiliated Monitors noted that it
has “provided independent monitoring on behalf of both federal and state
agencies,” including the Federal Communications Commission, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, state attorneys general, and
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. C. Ryan Barber, FTC and Herbalife Snub Big Law for Consulting Firm as Compliance
Monitor, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=1202768
427209/FTC-and-Herbalife-Snub-Big-Law-for-Consulting-Firm-As-Compliance-Monitor?m
code=1202617074964&curindex=0&slreturn=20160825110859 [https://perma.cc/U46H-KN
UN].
17. AFFILIATED MONITORS, INC., PROPOSAL OF AFFILIATED MONITORS, INC. IN RESPONSE
TO THE REQUEST FOR APPLICATIONS TO SERVE AS THE INDEPENDENT COMPLIANCE AUDITOR FOR
HERBALIFE 1 (2016) [hereinafter AFFILIATED MONITORS PROPOSAL], https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/982603/affiliated_monitors.pdf [https://perma.cc/
38GE-YLNR].
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various U.S. military organizations.18 As such, Affiliated Monitors has
overseen numerous remediation efforts employed by private firms at the
behest of governmental agencies, regulators, and prosecutors for over a
decade.19 Yet, Affiliated Monitors operates in a space devoid of formal
oversight, leaving very little to constrain the behavior of the monitoring firm
itself. Part I.A begins by discussing the challenges associated with
empowering courts to oversee monitorships. Part I.B then describes failed
statutory initiatives and limited prosecutorial guidance.
A. Challenges with Court Oversight
Courts often utilize judicially appointed agents to assist them in their
adjudication efforts and have done so for decades.20 Monitors are one type
of court-appointed agent. “After a finding of liability, [a monitor is] often
appointed at the remedial stage of complex cases to aid in formulating the
decree, assist the court in implementing it, and monitor compliance.”21 Over
time, however, monitorships have evolved and expanded outside the confines
of the traditional role as court-appointed agents.22
For instance, regulators and prosecutors utilize “enforcement
monitorships,” like that used for the Herbalife settlement, when entering into
negotiated settlement agreements to ensure that the monitored organization
adheres to the terms of the agreement.23 In an enforcement monitorship, the
monitor acts as an agent of the government,24 instead of an agent of the court,
and ensures that the monitored organization complies with the government’s
specifications.25 The negotiated settlement agreements that give rise to
enforcement monitorships are sometimes entered into after formal
proceedings against a corporation for alleged misconduct have been
brought.26 In these instances, the agreement, often termed a deferred
prosecution agreement, is negotiated by the regulator or prosecutor and the

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Root, supra note 5, at 116 (“Courts have used independent, private outsiders—courtappointed agents—to assist courts in their adjudication efforts for decades. These individuals
are referred to by a number of terms often used interchangeably, including master, special
master, receiver, trustee, or monitor.”).
21. Ellen E. Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 352
(discussing courts’ ability to appoint an outsider to assist the court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53).
22. See Root, supra note 5, at 120–23.
23. Id. at 124–27.
24. Guidance to Department of Justice attorneys regarding the use of monitors in
negotiated agreements states that the monitor is to be independent from and not an agent of
the government. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys 4–5 (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Morford Memo],
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8942-WS7R]. Despite this, in enforcement monitorships, the monitor functionally acts as an
agent of the government in a manner that looks quite similar to when a monitor is formally
acting as an agent of the court. See Root, supra note 11, at 528 n.12.
25. See Root, supra note 5, at 124.
26. Id.
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corporation.27 The parties then request that the court enter the agreement in
lieu of pursuing the normal adjudication schedule.28 The involvement of the
court in these instances has raised questions about the scope of the court’s
authority to oversee negotiated settlement agreements and the monitorships
they often require.
For example, a line of cases in the D.C. Circuit appears to suggest that
courts have little power over monitorships and negotiated settlement
agreements. In 2012, a D.C. district court determined that reports prepared
by a monitor were judicial records subject to the common law right of access
and ordered that the reports be disclosed publicly.29 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, thereby halting the public
release of the monitor’s reports.30 The D.C. Circuit explained that the records
were not pertinent to monitoring judicial conduct, because the monitor’s
reports
do not record, explain, or justify the court’s decision in any way—nor could
they. They did not exist yet, and nothing in the record suggest[ed] the
district court cared a whit about the results of the [monitor’s] investigation
as long as [the company] in fact initiated the investigation.31

In 2015, a D.C. district court held that a court could choose to accept or reject
a deferred prosecution agreement pursuant to its supervisory powers.32
When rejecting the agreement, the court provided several reasons for why it
found the agreement to be deficient, including its failure to require the
appointment of an independent monitor to verify that the company remained
in compliance with the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement.33 On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case for further proceedings.34 The D.C. Circuit concluded that
the district court had no authority to make substantive assessments regarding

27. See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 10, at 348–49.
28. Because deferred prosecution agreements involve the formal initiation of criminal
charges within the judicial system, the agreements trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s time limits
for the commencement of a criminal trial. See, e.g., United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818
F.3d 733, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Speedy Trial Act specifically allows a court to suspend
the running of the time within which to commence a trial for any period during which the
government defers prosecution under a deferred prosecution agreement. Id. Thus, parties
wishing to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement must go to the court to have the time
within which to commence trial suspended. See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate
Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833902 (“Under a
[deferred prosecution agreement], the prosecutor[] files charges but agrees not to seek
conviction.”) [https://perma.cc/DUV6-A9L2].
29. SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
30. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d at 2–3.
31. Id. at 4.
32. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated
and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
33. Id. at 166.
34. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733.
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the terms included in a deferred prosecution agreement, including
monitorship provisions.35
By contrast, however, in 2016, the Eastern District of New York
maintained that the court had authority to approve or deny a deferred
prosecution agreement and ordered the public release of the associated
enforcement monitor’s reports despite the vigorous objections of the
government, the monitor, and the monitored organization.36 The case is now
on appeal before the Second Circuit.37
Assuming the Second Circuit finds that courts have the power to make
decisions regarding deferred prosecution agreements and monitorships, the
decision would be limited in that it would not be applicable to all negotiated
settlement agreements. If prosecutors or regulators choose to pursue a
different type of negotiated settlement agreement, like a nonprosecution
agreement, which does not require any court involvement, it is not at all clear
that those types of negotiated settlement agreements would be subject to
court oversight or involvement. There are scholars who argue that
monitorships, whether arising out of deferred or nonprosecution agreements,
should be subject to court oversight,38 but as of yet, the issue remains
unsettled, as evidenced by the recent D.C. Circuit decisions.
Even if courts were to come to the conclusion that all monitorships arising
out of negotiated settlement agreements between regulators or prosecutors
and corporations should be subject to the same type of court oversight as
court-ordered monitorships, the use of monitors has evolved beyond the
enforcement monitorship context into other areas where court involvement
appears wholly inappropriate.39 For example, a public relations monitorship
is sometimes employed by an organization on a completely voluntary basis,
without the involvement of any regulatory or governmental body, to
investigate “the scope of organizational wrongdoing” and to provide “a
public accounting of the investigation, along with suggestions for
remediation measures.”40 “The monitorship is meant to remediate the
underlying organizational misconduct, but it is also meant to heal the
damaged relationship between the monitored organization and the public
through the monitorship’s deliverable—the public monitorship report.”41
Because the monitorship is entered into on a completely voluntary basis, “it

35. Id.
36. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013); HSBC Letter in Support of Filing under Seal at 5, HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter HSBC Letter].
37. Jody Godoy, Public Entitled to HSBC Monitor Report, 2nd Circ. Told, LAW360 (Oct.
20, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/853062/public-entitled-to-hsbc-monitor-report2nd-circ-told [https://perma.cc/FX8E-YHBE].
38. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 176–77, 192 (2014) (discussing the need for more robust court oversight of all
monitorships that are the outgrowth of a deferred or nonprosecution agreement).
39. See Root, supra note 5, at 137–42 (discussing public relations monitorships).
40. Id. at 137.
41. Id.
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does not appear that robust court oversight . . . would be appropriate” in this
setting.42
The upshot is that while the use of monitors originated in the courts,43 their
use has evolved beyond traditional judicial settings.44 This evolution makes
it difficult to rely on courts alone to ensure that monitors are accomplishing
their oversight duties in a proper and ethical manner. Additionally, because
monitorships now arise in a variety of settings and contexts, it may be that
different types of constraints are needed to address the particular challenges
individual monitorships present.45
B. Failed Statutory Attempts
and Limited Prosecutorial Guidance
The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act was proposed in the
House of Representatives in both 200846 and 2009,47 but it died in committee
each time. The proposed legislation (i) required monitors to be selected from
a public national pool of prequalified candidates, (ii) granted final monitor
selection approval to a judge, (iii) dictated that the monitor selection process
be “an open and competitive one where the monitor’s powers should extend
no further than the compliance concerns at the [monitored] firm,” and (iv)
required monitors to receive payments based on a flat- and fixed-fee
structure.48 It appears the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act arose,
at least in part, due to concerns raised by a monitorship undertaken by former
Attorney General John Ashcroft in the fall of 2007.49
When Chris Christie served as the federal prosecutor in New Jersey, he
turned to his former boss, John Ashcroft, to serve as a monitor to Zimmer
Holdings, a medical supply company in Indiana.50 The monitorship was
awarded without public notice or bidding and was worth $28 million to $52
million for eighteen months of work.51 The contract was considered by some
to be “evidence of political favoritism in the Bush administration’s longembattled Justice Department,” and it prompted an internal Department of
Justice review that resulted in formal guidelines to prosecutors in the
selection and use of monitors.52 These formal guidelines are contained in
what has colloquially been termed the “Morford Memo.”

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 147.
See id. at 116–18.
See id. at 118–23.
See id. at 142–54.
Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008).
Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009).
See Vikramaditya Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 226, 238 (Anthony
S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011).
49. Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/washington/10justice.html?_r=
[https://
perma.cc/X7BL-UWGW].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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The Morford Memo provides guidance to all Department of Justice
employees regarding the selection and use of monitors in deferred and
nonprosecution agreements with corporations.53 The memorandum contains
nine “principles” that provide standards for monitor selection, independence,
responsibilities, communication, recommendations, reporting obligations,
and duration.54
The proposed legislation and the Morford Memo were designed to provide
greater clarity and accountability in the utilization of monitorships.
Unfortunately, each of these initiatives is relatively narrow in scope because
they apply to a limited subset of monitorships. The restrictions put forth in
the proposed legislation and in the Morford Memo would not, however, apply
to the Herbalife monitorship, as it is not a result of a deferred or
nonprosecution agreement.55 Instead, it is the product of a negotiated
settlement agreement between the Federal Trade Commission and Herbalife
that took the form of a stipulated order for permanent injunction and
monetary judgment.56 Additionally, the Herbalife monitorship is not subject
to the Morford Memo because the Morford Memo “does not apply to
agencies other than the Department of Justice”; the Federal Trade
Commission is independent of the Department of Justice.57 Moreover,
neither the proposed legislation nor the Morford Memo would govern public
relations monitorships.58
Thus, attempts to constrain monitorships through statutory intervention
and prosecutorial guidance, like the use of court oversight, appear to be ill
suited to tackle the full scope of challenges that arise when confronting
monitorships.59 Because monitorships are utilized in a variety of contexts by
a diverse group of regulators, prosecutors, and private parties, attempts to
constrain monitorships have proven quite difficult.

53. See generally Morford Memo, supra note 24.
54. Id. at 3–8.
55. Cf. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong.
(2009) (“A bill [t]o regulate certain deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution
agreements in Federal criminal cases.”).
56. See Stipulation to Entry of Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment,
FTC v. Herbalife Int’l. of Am., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-05217 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) [hereinafter
Herbalife Agreement].
57. Morford Memo, supra note 24, at 2–3.
58. See supra Part I.A.
59. Other tactics can be utilized to provide standards and norms to govern the behavior of
various compliance actors. For example, “[l]awyers appearing and practicing before federal
[administrative] agencies . . . are often subject to additional ethical rules promulgated by the
agencies.” George M. Cohen, The Laws of Agency Lawyering, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963,
1963 (2016). Some agency rules apply to lawyers only, while others apply “to any person
appearing in a representative capacity before an agency.” Id. at 1964. Thus, it would seem
possible for agencies to develop their own set of rules governing monitor behavior; but
because monitors are used in so many diverse contexts and before so many different regulators
and prosecutors, any attempt to use this tactic to regulate monitorships would necessarily be
limited in scope and breadth.

2017]

CONSTRAINING MONITORS

2235

II. PROFESSIONALISM’S FAILURES
AND REPUTATION’S LIMITATIONS
The explanation provided in Part I is consistent with previous scholarship
and accepted understandings regarding the evolution of monitorships and the
difficulties associated with creating a regime of oversight to govern monitor
behavior.60 It is, however, incomplete.
When private actors are charged with performing certain actions on behalf
of the public, there are often mechanisms put into place to ensure that the
private actors execute those duties responsibly. For example, lawyers are
required to adhere to certain standards of professional conduct promulgated
by state bar associations that can discipline attorneys who violate those
standards.61 Similarly, certified public accountants must adhere to specific
state licensure requirements to practice public accounting.62 Further,
individuals who serve as brokers for, or dealers to, third parties in the sale of
securities are required to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, join a self-regulatory organization, and adhere to state
requirements for a person conducting business as a broker-dealer within that
state.63 Monitors are not all that different from these individuals.
Monitors are private actors who manage the largely public function of
overseeing remediation efforts at dozens, if not hundreds, of organizations
every day. They are not, however, subject to licensing, registration, or formal
regulatory requirements, but they could be. Part II.A begins by explaining
how bar associations view their regulatory role in a narrow fashion, which
has allowed quasi-legal functions to operate outside of formal oversight. Part
II.B then discusses a potential fix proposed by the bar, which is, at best, quite
limited. Finally, Part II.C concludes by turning to the main factor that
appears to serve as a constraint on monitor behavior: reputation.
A. The Bar’s Failure
Lawyer conduct is regulated by state bar associations, which promulgate
rules of professional conduct.64 Current rules, while sometimes referred to
as ethical norms, are more regulatory in nature than true expositions

60. See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 683 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson,
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2007)
(discussing the historical underpinnings of corporate monitors and relating corporate monitors
to the use of special masters, which dates back to the early sixteenth century); Root, supra
note 11, at 526.
61. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 13–18
(4th ed. 2005).
62. See CPA Licensure, AM. INST. CPAS, https://www.aicpa.org/BECOMEACPA/
LICENSURE/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (discussing CPA licensure
requirements and providing state information on specific state requirements)
[https://perma.cc/7QPW-P6JU].
63. Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/
bdguide.htm#II (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DN5H-4ZUK].
64. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 61, at 13–14.
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regarding proper ethical behavior.65 The rules’ “appeal is not to conscience,
but to sanction. It seeks mandate rather than insight.”66 This view of the role
of the bar as a mere regulatory mechanism, however, was not always the case.
Fifty years ago, understandings of professionalism
conceive[d] of the professions as groups of individuals who have mastered
an area of knowledge through special training. Because they gain[ed] their
power through knowledge—not wealth or political prestige—professionals
[were considered] uniquely suited to ascertain what is best for the public as
a whole and to suppress their own immediate interest in achieving it.67

Indeed, the “government and society in general turned to the well-trained
expert,” like a lawyer, “to help preserve fairness, justice, and progress in an
increasingly complex industrial world.”68 In particular, lawyers were
conceived of as intermediaries between the interests of the state and society.69
Lawyers’ fidelity to the rule of law as officers of the court required them to
pursue justice over self-motivated interests. Additionally, lawyers “were
considered critical not only for their understanding of complex facts, but also
for their ability to use those facts to envision a new and better community.”70
Yet, by the 1970s and 1990s lawyers abandoned this role “in favor of new
roles straddling law and business.”71
The organized bar was once intent on drawing sharp distinctions between
law and business, but the rise of the regulatory state changed the playing
field. As regulation came to pervade society, new kinds of work and roles
proliferated. Law and business grew together, and a murky and ambiguous
boundary zone replaced the once-crisp demarcation between the two.
Today’s quasi-legal roles, embraced by many lawyers and encouraged by
the organized bar, exist in this broadened and blurred boundary zone in
which legal training and licensure are valuable but professional ethical
obligations are unclear.72

The role of monitors and the function they provide to society exists in this
murky, quasi-legal boundary zone.73
65. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963,
963 (1987).
66. Id.
67. Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 651
(2016).
68. Id. at 650.
69. Id. at 652; see also Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal
Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1247 (2014).
70. Roiphe, supra note 67, at 660–61.
71. Remus, supra note 69, at 1247; Roiphe, supra note 67, at 663, 672–73; see also
ANTHONY T. KRONMON, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1–4
(1993) (discussing the decline of the “lawyer-statesman” ideal).
72. Remus, supra note 69, at 1246.
73. Other similar disputes have occurred regarding what accounts for the practice of law.
For example, mediation services undertaken by nonlawyers have been seen as similarly
suspect conduct. See generally Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and
Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235–36 (2002) (explaining the “blurred boundaries between the legal
profession” and nonlawyer mediators and arguing that mediation practice “often slides into
the practice of law”).
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Monitors are not in an attorney-client relationship with the organizations
they monitor, even when the monitor is, as is often the case, an attorney. As
was the case in the Herbalife monitorship, the development of a formal
attorney-client relationship during the course of a monitorship is either
strictly prohibited74 or purposefully avoided.75 This is despite the fact that at
least part of the service monitors provide looks very similar to the service
lawyers often provide to clients when in a formal attorney-client
relationship—advising clients on whether their activities conform to legal
and regulatory requirements. Monitoring relationships, however, are treated
as outside the bounds of attorney regulation. In part, this is because the
monitor’s legal advice is almost inextricably intertwined with what would
qualify as oversight of the routine development of business strategies and
practices. This secondary piece is what causes standard regulation by bar
associations to be inapplicable to monitorships because the bar has chosen to
provide one “single, broadly applicable code of conduct”76 in lieu of a more
complex regulatory system.
Recognizing the problem of a unitary system of attorney regulation, legal
academics in the early 1990s promoted the use of “context-specific rules [that
would] govern different practice areas.”77 The original context-specific rules
proposed by legal academics in the early 1990s were suggested, at least in
part, because “lawyers need more leeway to advocate zealously for clients
when litigating than when offering advice and guidance in a nonadversarial
context.”78 Like lawyers operating outside of a litigation setting, a monitor
is not in a role that requires advocacy. Instead, the monitor is charged with
overseeing a company’s remediation effort and, when necessary, assisting the
monitored firm in making the adjustments necessary to ensure success. The
monitor provides this service to the monitored company, but it is also serving
a public function. Yet, even the context-specific rules advocated in the early
1990s failed to “account[] for one of the most significant sources of change
and ethical tension facing the profession today—the emergence of a robust
but ambiguous boundary zone between law and business.”79
The bar could have responded to the proliferation of new, quasi-legal roles
“by working to extend its jurisdiction and ethical rules to cover additional
work sites,” but, instead, “bar leaders declined to act definitively, neither
bringing quasi-legal work clearly within, nor excluding it clearly from, the
profession’s jurisdiction.”80 As a result, in most states, “lawyers who offer

74. See, e.g., Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 18.
75. See Root, supra note 5, at 138–39.
76. Remus, supra note 69, at 1245.
77. Id. Today, academics continue to recognize the utility in adopting legal ethics rules
that are of a more specialized nature, whether through formal rules of professional conduct or
through the adopting of rules by courts. See, e.g., Bruce Green, Should There Be a Specialized
Ethics Code for Death-Penalty Defense Lawyers?, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527 (2016).
78. Remus, supra note 69, at 1255 (citing David Wilkins, Making Context Count:
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1183–84 (1993)).
79. Id. at 1256.
80. Id. at 1260.

2238

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

law-related services without also engaging in the practice of law are not
bound by” the rules of professional conduct.81
Thus, a lawyer can be a member of the bar, market his legal expertise and
prowess, be awarded a monitorship, and then operate the monitorship with
almost no fear of reprisal from the bar should the lawyer-monitor engage in
inappropriate conduct. For example, in Affiliated Monitors’s application to
serve as Herbalife’s monitor, it notes that its proposed team members include
individuals with experience as “government and private practice
attorneys.”82 It also indicates that the monitoring team would be led by two
specific individuals, one of whom has significant past legal experience and
current, active involvement in the American Bar Association and the
National Association of Former U.S. Attorneys.83 Yet, as is noted in the
application, “[o]ne distinguishing characteristic of Affiliated Monitors is that
monitoring is [its] business; it is not a sideline to legal or consulting
services.”84 Because of the bar’s decision to omit quasi-legal conduct from
attorney regulation, Affiliated Monitors’s business activities and the
activities of the lawyers they employ will largely proceed without formal,
independent oversight.85
B. The Quasi Fix
Despite the limitations of the bar’s unitary system of regulation, it has
acknowledged the need for monitor guidance. Because the bar chose not to
formally regulate quasi-legal roles, however, its options were limited. On
August 4, 2015, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates
approved black letter “ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for Corporate
Monitors.”86 The standards were described as “for the first time—
provid[ing] a framework through which corporate monitors, legislatures,
courts and administrative agencies can make decisions on developing and
implementing an organization’s corporate compliance and ethics program.”87
The standards are, necessarily, nonbinding and advisory in nature for both
lawyers and nonlawyers.88 Their goal is not to provide formal regulation but
81. Id. at 1261.
82. See AFFILIATED MONITORS PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 2.
83. Id. at 15–16.
84. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
85. In part, this is because the vast majority of the rules of professional conduct apply only
within the context of an attorney-client relationship and are therefore inapplicable to contexts
when a lawyer serves as a monitor to an organization. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). Moreover, the lawyer-monitor is often expressly precluded
from entering into an attorney-client relationship with the monitored organization. See, e.g.,
Root, supra note 11, at 541. As such, lawyers serving as monitors are typically subject to
sanction only for violation of catchall provisions, which prohibit activity like “engag[ing] in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4(c).
86. ABA Adopts Best Practices to Guide Corporate Monitors, A.B.A. NEWS (Aug. 4,
2015,
6:00
PM),
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2015/08/aba_adopts_best_prac.html [https://perma.cc/J94J-LM5A].
87. Id.
88. Work remains underway to provide commentary to accompany the “black letter”
standards. Monitors Standards, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
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instead to provide guidance to individuals—lawyers and nonlawyers alike—
who undertake monitorships.
From a substantive perspective, the standards appropriately provide a highlevel overview of the types of concerns and issues that monitorships raise.
The standards discuss issues for parties to consider in the selection of
monitors, the development of a work plan, and the setting of fees and
compensation.89 They also provide a strong set of recommendations for how
to analyze potential conflicts of interest within the monitoring relationship.90
The standards, however, do not engage in an in-depth consideration of a
variety of issues that are of common concern regarding monitorships. For
example, the standards explain that the order or agreement resulting in the
monitorship “should state whether the Monitor’s report is to be confidential
or whether it is to be made available to the public,” but it does not provide
any guidance on when a report should remain confidential or how to ensure
such confidentiality.91 Thus, while the standards are certainly helpful, they
do not appear to wrestle with some of the thornier issues that arise during the
course of today’s monitor engagements.
C. Reliance on Reputation
As monitorships evolved outside the context of formal adjudication, the
monitoring relationship began to form between the monitor and monitored
organization through what are essentially private contracts. These private
contracts do not look all that dissimilar from the contracts between attorneys
or auditors and their clients. For example, Affiliated Monitors and Herbalife
will enter into an agreement for Affiliated Monitors to provide monitoring
services on behalf of Herbalife, and Herbalife will agree to pay Affiliated
Monitors for its services.92 The terms of the monitorship agreement, at least
in part, are predetermined based on the negotiated settlement agreement
entered into between Herbalife and the Federal Trade Commission,93 but that
does not erode the reality that contractual terms control the relationship
between Herbalife and Affiliated Monitors. Because (i) attempts to oversee
monitorships via the courts are limited in scope, (ii) legislative efforts have
failed, and (iii) the bar has chosen not to regulate quasi-legal conduct, these
private contractual terms govern the conduct of the individual monitors who
are charged with overseeing remediation efforts at organizations involved in
misconduct.94

standards/MonitorsStandardsFourthEdition-TableofContents.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/PEG6-NAWV].
89. Id.
90. Id. Standards 24-2.4(4), 24-2.5, 24-4.6(2).
91. Id. Standard 24-4.3(4).
92. Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 18; Barber, supra note 16.
93. Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 18–23.
94. The contractual terms governing the monitorship must, however, adhere to any
restrictions set forth by a court or negotiated settlement agreement. For example, a negotiated
settlement agreement may state that (i) the monitor is not permitted to enter into an attorneyclient relationship with the monitored organization or (ii) certain procedures must be followed
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As evidenced by the numerous applications filed to serve as Herbalife’s
monitor, individuals and entities are eager to enter into monitoring
agreements. As such, they work hard to make themselves look like attractive
candidates to serve as a corporation’s monitor. Because the monitored
organization is typically unable to discharge the monitor if it is displeased
with the monitor’s work,95 monitored organizations that are able to provide
input on the identity of a monitor take the selection process quite seriously.
In many instances, however, the external monitor must also market
themselves to a party outside the monitoring contract, whether that be a
regulator, prosecutor, or the public at large. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission and Herbalife selected the monitor via mutual agreement.96 As
such, the monitor must often also meet what can be very exacting standards
of third parties with a vested interest in the monitoring engagement. These
unique features of monitorship relationships and agreements make the
monitor’s reputation of incredibly high value.
“Reputational capital is the value of [a] contractor’s reputation in the
relevant marketplace.”97 As demonstrated by the proceeding discussion, it
appears that a monitor’s reputational capital is quite important in its pursuit
of monitorship engagements. If a monitor develops a bad reputation with
either monitored firms or interested third parties, such as regulators, the
monitor will likely find it difficult to obtain future engagements. Research
has demonstrated that, when self-enforcing contracts are involved, “the party
with significant reputational capital would think long and hard before
violating unstated contractual norms and damaging her valuable reputation,”
making the party “more trustworthy than a transactor whose reputation has
little value.”98 The majority of monitoring contracts do not appear to be selfenforcing,99 but the overarching principle does appear applicable in the
monitoring context, where, unlike in the context of the traditional attorneyclient relationship, there are very limited options to exit the monitoring
agreement. Monitors, while not subject to governance from courts, formal
standards, or formal rules, are thought to be unlikely to engage in unethical
or inappropriate behavior because they maintain a high interest in preserving
the value of their reputational capital.100 Thus, the monitor’s interest in
in the event of a dispute between the monitor and the monitored organization. Root, supra note
11, at 541, 544–45.
95. See, e.g., Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 22–23.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 601, 671 (2007).
98. Id.
99. A self-enforcing contract is an agreement or contract between two parties that is
enforced only by those two parties; a third party is not able to enforce or interfere with the
agreement. Most monitoring contracts do have third parties that are able to interfere with the
agreement—the regulator, prosecutor, or court. See, e.g., Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56,
at 21 (explaining that if the monitor determines that the company is not in compliance with
the negotiated settlement terms the monitor will notify the regulator).
100. Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 748–50 (2004) (explaining that when
actors are “‘paid to verify another party’s information’ by ‘signal[ing] [that information’s]
value through their individual reputations,’” they do so in part by relying on their reputational
capital (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Ronald J. Gilson, Value
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maintaining positive reputational capital serves to constrain the monitor’s
behavior.
And yet, while reputational capital has a variety of benefits, it also has
certain drawbacks. Reputational capital makes it important for monitors to
manage their conduct within the marketplace of entities that utilize
monitoring services, but this incentive is inherently self-interested on the part
of the monitor who wants to obtain additional monitorship engagements.
Scholars have expressed concern about the use of reputational capital to
restrain behavior in similar settings. For example, financial intermediaries,
like monitors, rely heavily upon their reputations. Indeed, “many economists
and other academics have long argued that the value of a good reputation
should ensure that intermediaries generally act honestly and place their
clients’ interests above their own.”101 Recent scholarship, however, explains
that “a series of scandals . . . suggest investment bankers, credit rating
agencies, accountants, and other intermediaries regularly prioritize their
short-term interests in fee maximization, even when doing so is contrary to
their clients’ best interests.”102 This concern is
exacerbated when a class of intermediaries is entrenched and new entry
difficult, as the value of reputation in such settings tends to be determined
on a relative basis. When a party has no choice but to rely upon a particular
type of intermediary, the business will go to the intermediaries whose
reputations are relatively untarnished, no matter how far from shiny that
might be.103

Thus, a monitor has a strong incentive to carefully manage her reputation in
an effort to ensure that she will be chosen for future monitorships, but
reliance on reputational capital is inherently limited in its effectiveness.
III. IMPLICATIONS
As explained in Parts I and II, monitors, like Affiliated Monitors, enter into
monitorship agreements every day without the benefit of concrete rules
governing their conduct. In turn, the remediation effort that the monitor is
meant to oversee for the protection of those harmed by corporate
misconduct—like the consumers and employees who entered into
transactions with Herbalife—is plagued by structural weaknesses that could
undermine the monitorship’s long-term effectiveness. Additionally, a
monitor’s reputational capital alone has proven insufficient to address these
potential problems, as it does not provide guidance on many difficult policy
issues relevant to monitorships.
In an effort to begin to address these issues, this part outlines three
potential areas where additional research would be beneficial in attempting
to discern appropriate regulatory mechanisms for governing monitorships.
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 289 (1984),
then quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanics of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613–21 (1984))).
101. Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 1522 (2013).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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First, the difficulties associated with determining when, how, and to whom
information gathered by a monitor should be disseminated is a challenging
issue that could benefit from additional scholarly attention. Second, the
concept of monitor independence would benefit from more analysis and
scholarly inquiry. Third, strategies for better utilizing a monitor’s identity as
a sanctioning mechanism should be considered and assessed.
A. Information Disclosure
Developing a strong, deeply ingrained compliance culture is no simple
task, and poses particular challenges to HSBC Group in light of the depth
of the cultural deficiencies that fostered the intentional criminal conduct
that led to the [deferred prosecution agreement] and the size and scope of
the Bank’s operations. Although the Bank has taken many positive steps
during the past year, the fact remains that it has moved too slowly and made
too little progress toward instilling the type of culture it will need in order
to build an effective [anti-money laundering] and sanctions compliance
program—and to maintain that program when it is no longer subject to the
Monitor’s supervision.104
–HSBC Monitor’s Report

Should statements like the above be public and, if not, how can the public
be assured that a company will take the actions necessary to assure similar
misconduct does not reoccur? Those questions appear to be at the center of
a several-year feud involving the judiciary, government regulators and
prosecutors, corporate entities, private attorneys, reporters, and the public at
large about the proper regulation and oversight of the use of monitors.
For example, HSBC failed to enhance its anti-money laundering
compliance, which created a deficient anti-money laundering program. As a
result, “at least $881 million in drug trafficking proceeds, including proceeds
of drug trafficking by the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico . . . were laundered
through HSBC Bank USA without being detected.”105 Ultimately, HSBC
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice
and agreed to retain a monitor for a five-year term.106 The monitor’s
mandate, in part, was to “mak[e] recommendations reasonably designed to
improve the effectiveness of HSBC Group’s program for ensuring
compliance with anti-money laundering laws as well as HSBC Group’s
implementation and adherence to [certain] remedial measures.”107 To
facilitate its mandate, the monitor “conduct[ed] an initial review and
prepare[ed] an initial report, followed by at least four (4) follow-up reviews
and report[s].”108 One of these required reports has sparked the latest high104. Stephen Dockery, U.S. Judge Sends Parting Shot to HSBC over Compliance Report,
WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 10, 2016, 4:31 PM) (first alteration in original),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/03/10/u-s-judge-sends-parting-shot-to-hsbcover-compliance-report/ [https://perma.cc/SL4Q-ZBXB].
105. Deferred Prosecution Agreement attachment A at 3, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. 1:12-cr-00763-ILG (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter HSBC 2012 DPA].
106. Id. attachment B at B-1 to -2.
107. Id. attachment B at B-5 to -6.
108. Id. attachment B at B-4 to -5.
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profile debate regarding the appropriate set of rules and standards for
governing monitorships.
The question of whether monitor reports should be made public is not an
easy one. The monitor himself, despite criticizing HSBC in the report,
argued against its public disclosure:
I believe that maintaining the confidentiality of the First Annual FollowUp Review Report is in the interest of an effective monitorship because it
is clear to me that confidentiality encourages cooperation from the
employees of HSBC Group. Much of my work as Monitor depends on full,
open, and candid cooperation from employees at all levels of the Bank, and
thus far, I have enjoyed an appropriate level of such cooperation from
employees of HSBC Group. I believe, however, that releasing this report
publicly would have a chilling effect on those employees, and the level of
cooperation and candor that I would receive could decrease substantially.
The employees might well become concerned that they would suffer
negative repercussions from their statements, or information they have
provided, being made public. The result would be that I would have less
information with which to make my findings and recommendations, which
ultimately would not be to the benefit of the public or the Bank.109

The monitor’s claims create a bit of a conundrum. The public has an interest
in knowing whether HSBC has taken steps to ensure that it will not launder
the money of Mexican drug cartels in the future. Yet, if the public’s detailed
knowledge of the remediation process will deter cooperation by HSBC
employees with the monitor, public disclosure may actually harm HSBC’s
efforts toward remediation. Relying on reputational capital to govern
monitorships cannot solve this quagmire.
Thus, a full inquiry is needed into the set of rules and standards that might
balance these competing interests, and this analysis may need to
acknowledge that different rules could be needed for different monitorship
contexts. Moreover, because monitorships, as noted above, are utilized by
dozens of state and federal regulators to oversee and assist in remediation
efforts across a variety of regulatory areas, the stakes are quite high.
B. Monitor Independence
Concerns regarding monitor independence almost always focus on the
monitor’s independence from the monitored institution. The general
requirement that a monitor be independent of the monitored institution is
likely a result of (i) concerns regarding monitor capture110 and (ii) a relatively
simple conflict of interest analysis.111 The requirement is viewed as
relatively uncontroversial, and a review of management literature suggests
that the use of an independent, private outsider is likely a sound decision.

109. Affidavit of Michael G. Cherkasky at 3, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No.
1:12-cr-00763-ILG (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015).
110. Root, supra note 11, at 579–80.
111. See, e.g., Monitor Standards, supra note 88, Standard 24-4.1.
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For example, the institution is more likely to get an untainted assessment
from someone without a strong, prior affiliation with the monitored
institution.
[A] study of accountants has demonstrated that the entity an accountant
works for has a significant impact on the accountant’s findings. In one
study, “139 professional auditors employed full-time by one of the Big Four
accounting firms in the United States” were given auditing problems to
assess. “Half of the participants’ materials told them that they had been
hired as the external auditor for the firm in question.” The other half were
told “that they were working for an outside investor considering investing
money in the firm.” The study hypothesized, and proved, that “participants
would be more likely to conclude that the accounting behind a firm’s
financial reports complied with [GAAP] if they were working for the firm
rather than for an outsider investor.” This study confirmed opinions
that . . . had [been] expressed [by others].
Specifically, that
“[i]ndependence is necessary to prevent auditors from biasing their
opinions in favor of their clients.” . . . [T]his study demonstrate[s] the
importance of maintaining a strong level of independence when attempting
to evaluate an institution’s compliance with legal and regulatory
requirements.112

Thus, the insistence that monitors remain completely independent of the
monitored organization should likely reassure regulators, prosecutors, and
the public that the monitorship is likely to result in appropriate remediation
efforts.113
Despite the clear benefits of requiring the monitor to remain independent
of the monitored organization, there are at least two additional concerns that
may be preventing the monitor from achieving true monitor independence.
First, monitors, while unable to turn a monitored organization immediately
into a client after the conclusion of the monitorship, can typically begin to do
work for the monitored organization one or two years after the conclusion of
the monitorship.114 This relatively short “cooling-off” period may create the

112. Root, supra note 5, at 155 (fifth alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting
Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflicts of Interest and the Intrusion of
Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37 (2010), then quoting Max H. Bazerman & Don
Moore, Is It Time for Auditor Independence Yet?, 36 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 310 (2011)).
113. That is not to suggest that there may not be some efficiencies lost by requiring monitor
independence. For example, it may be that allowing a firm that previously worked with a
company in addressing issues related to the underlying misconduct to serve as the monitor
would eliminate some redundancies of work. Additionally, allowing a firm with a prior
relationship to oversee a monitorship might result in a more cooperative relationship during
the course of the monitorship. In general, however, it appears that the concerns regarding
capture and conflicts of interest are perceived to outweigh the benefit of the efficiencies gained
by employing a monitor who is not independent of the monitored organization.
114. See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 10, at 354–55; VDP Protocol 8: Participant
Hires a Compliance Monitor, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTVOLDISPRO/Resources/2720448-1300821628018/VDP_Proctocol_8.pdf (last visited
Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/S73K-ULSP].
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same incentive that the external auditor felt to ensure a “good” outcome on
behalf of the audited institution.115
Second, there has likely been insufficient attention paid to the importance
of employing a monitor that has significant independence from a previous
role as an employee of the government or a regulator.116 For example, “half
of all corporate monitors appointed in Justice Department deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with corporate defendants since
2001 are former prosecutors.”117 The use of former prosecutors and highranking government officials, in some instances shortly after the individuals
depart government service, may result in the monitor’s failure to take a truly
“independent” perspective when conducting the monitorship. Instead, the
monitor may still be viewing information from her role as a prosecutor, which
could affect her assessment of the activities being undertaken by the firm.
For example, a recent hire by a prominent monitoring firm stated that,
“[c]oming from the government, I understand the regulator’s perspective, and
I’m well positioned to help companies reform their practices to meet
regulators’ expectations.”118 This perspective may very well be important,
but the reliance on former government attorneys to serve as monitors does
raise a variety of questions regarding whether monitors are truly acting as
independent, objective evaluators.
The upshot is that additional research into the appropriate boundaries of
monitor independence is needed and this too is something that cannot be
answered by relying on the constraint of reputational capital. It may be that
requiring a more robust independence requirement for monitors may serve to
improve the effectiveness of monitorships. Additionally, an independence
requirement could possibly address concerns of both regulators and
institutions alike regarding the monitor’s ability to effectively oversee the
monitored organization’s remediation efforts.

115. The appropriate response to this potential detriment to independence is not clear. The
knee-jerk reaction would likely be to extend cooling-off periods, but recent scholarship
examining concerns regarding independence of individuals who move back and forth between
the private and public sectors has suggested that concerns regarding the conflicts of interests
created by the “revolving door” may be overblown. See generally David Zaring, Against Being
Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507; Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015).
116. There have been many instances where criticisms have arisen out of the selection of a
monitor with strong ties to the Justice Department. Those concerns were generally related to
issues of cronyism. See, e.g., Shenon, supra note 49.
117. Alison Frankel, DOJ Should End Secret Selection Process for Corporate Watchdogs,
REUTERS (July 14, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/07/14/doj-should-endsecret-selection-process-for-corporate-watchdogs (discussing research findings of Professor
Brandon Garrett) [https://perma.cc/D8VJ-BJVN].
118. Ben Protess, Guidepost Solutions, a Corporate Monitor, Hires State Regulator, N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/business/
guidepost-solutions-a-corporate-monitor-hires-state-regulator.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
V8ZJ-GNMW].
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C. Identity as a Sanctioning Mechanism
As is explained above, the primary check on monitor behavior is the
monitor’s own concern with her reputation. Risking one’s own reputation
when taking on an engagement can serve as a powerful motivator, and it may
be enough to serve as an effective check on the conduct of most monitors.
Therefore, it may be sensible to require any use of a monitor to publicly name
a person—not an entity—who is responsible for overseeing the monitorship.
An actual person should take ownership of the monitorship, thereby risking
her own reputation if the monitorship fails.
For example, the “Independent Foreclosure Review”119 demonstrates what
can happen when a monitorship occurs without requiring an individual to
take personal responsibility for the monitorship. As part of the Independent
Foreclosure Review, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve required banks to retain independent consultants to oversee
the banks’ efforts to remediate the harm caused by the banks’ failures to
comply with their own policies and procedures. The independent consultants
selected were not individuals who could be held personally responsible for
mistakes or inappropriate conduct; they were large entities, like Big Four
accounting firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte.120 As such,
when they failed to detect relatively routine issues—like conflicts of
interests—there was no individual person to hold responsible. There was just
an entity to fine or fire.
People can hide within entities; they can blame mistakes or wrongdoing
on other employees, unclear guidance, or a myriad of other excuses. But if
monitors were required to identify, explicitly and publicly, an actual person
to be held responsible for ensuring that the monitorship is functioning
properly, it could serve as a way to facilitate a sanction for inappropriate
monitor behavior.
In turn, if monitors were individually identified, it may provide an
opportunity to rely on existing professional standards as a way to encourage
appropriate monitor behavior. If, for example, monitors were named
individually and were members of a regulated profession, it may provide an
opportunity for sanctioning monitors who engage in inappropriate behavior,
albeit in very narrow contexts. For example, if monitors were required to be
attorneys and, thus, were members of the legal profession, it is likely that a
catchall provision like Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c)—which
makes it professional misconduct to “engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”121—could serve as a basis for
personally sanctioning monitors engaged in inappropriate behavior. During
119. See, e.g., What You Need to Know: Independent Foreclosure Review, BD. GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS. (May 12, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/independentforeclosure-review.htm [https://perma.cc/9MHU-ENPT].
120. Francine
McKenna,
Another
Conflicted
Foreclosure
Review:
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ally/ResCap, FORBES (June 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/francinemckenna/2013/06/25/another-conflicted-foreclosure-review-pricewaterhouse
coopers-and-allyrescap/ [https://perma.cc/UY9K-2BZ4].
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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the Independent Foreclosure Review, several of the accounting firms retained
as independent consultants failed to properly identify and disclose relevant
conflicts of interest.122 In some instances, this resulted in sanctions to the
general institutions retained as monitors, but there were no formal personal
consequences levied as a result of this failure. If an individual lawyer were
retained as the monitor instead, it would allow for potential personal,
reputational consequences as well as the possibility, even if unlikely, of
pursuing professional sanctions specifically against the individual. In short,
the ability to obtain an official sanction that could impact the individual
monitor’s livelihood would likely create a strong, personal incentive for the
monitor to engage in robust ethical conduct. The best mechanisms for
achieving a sanction for monitors, however, require more thought, research,
and analysis.
CONCLUSION
Monitors are charged with overseeing an institution’s effort to address
misconduct within its walls, while the monitor herself acts without formal
oversight or technical restraint. This Article adds to the understanding of
monitorships in three important ways. First, this Article demonstrates how
the lack of regulation governing monitorships is, in part, the result of the bar’s
resistance to regulate quasi-legal positions undertaken by lawyers. Second,
it shows that the primary constraint on a monitor’s behavior is the monitor’s
own interest in her reputation. Third, and most importantly, this Article
highlights several limitations of reputational capital as a constraining
mechanism on monitor behavior and long-term monitorship policy, thereby
demonstrating the need for more robust and careful research into several
areas of potential concern for monitorships.

122. Id.

